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Abstract
Scientific theories need to be testable by observations, say using Bayes’
theorem. A complete theory needs at least the three parts of dynamical
laws for specified physical variables, the correct solution of the dynamical
laws (boundary conditions), and the connection with observations or ex-
perience or conscious perceptions (laws of psycho-physical parallelism).
Principles are proposed for Bayesian meta-theories. One framework that
obeys these principles is Sensible Quantum Mechanics (SQM), which is
discussed. In principle, it allows one to test between single-history and
many-worlds theories, and to discuss threats to certain theories from fake
universes and Boltzmann brains. The threat of fake universes may be dis-
missed if one doubts the substrate-independence of consciousness, which
seems very implausible in the SQM framework. Boltzmann brains seem
more problematic, though there are many conceivable solutions. SQM
also suggests the possibility that past steps along our evolutionary an-
cestry may be so rare that they have occurred nowhere else within the
part of the universe that we can observe.
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1 Goals and criteria for scientific theories
I see science as having the following goals:
1. Theories to explain observations
2. Observation-weighted probabilities for these theories
3. Predictions for these theories
4. Understanding of these theories
A complete theory or model of the universe needs at least three parts:
1. Complete set of physical variables (e.g., the arguments of a wavefunction
or quantum state) and dynamical laws (e.g., the Schro¨dinger equation,
or the action for a path integral)
2. The correct solution of the dynamical laws (e.g., the wavefunction or
quantum state of the universe)
3. The connection with observation or experience (e.g., the laws of psycho-
physical parallelism)
Item 1 alone is called a TOE or ‘theory of everything,’ but it is not com-
plete. Even 1 and 2 alone are not complete, since they by themselves do not
logically determine what, if any, conscious experiences occur in a universe.
One can do a Bayesian analysis for the epistemic probabilities of theories,
which include the following elements:
1. Prior probabilities pi ≡ p(Ti) for theories Ti
• Necessarily subjective (in my view)
• Perhaps favoring simplicity, e.g., pi = 2−n(Ti), where n(Ti) is an
ordering of the theories in increasing order of complexity
• Simplicity itself seems subjective
2. Conditional probabilities Lij ≡ P (Oj |Ti) of observations Oj given theo-
ries Ti (the likelihoods of the theories given the observations)
3. Posterior probabilities
Pij ≡ P (Ti|Oj) = P (Ti&Oj)
P (Oj)
=
p(Ti)P (Oj |Ti)∑
k p(Tk)P (Oj |Tk)
=
piLij∑
k pkLkj
(1)
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In theories giving many observations, it is controversial what the condi-
tional probabilities Lij ≡ P (Oj |Ti) should be taken to be [1, 2]. Is Lij the
probability that Oj occurs somewhere in theory Ti [1]? In classical mechanics,
this would be Lij = 1 if Oj occurs and Lij = 0 if not. In conventional quantum
mechanics, this would be Lij = 〈ψi|POj |ψi〉, where |ψi〉 is the quantum state
given by the theory T1 and POj is the projection operator onto the observation
Oj .
This proposal for Lij would not give observational distinctions between
different theories all giving Lij = 1. If Ti gives a universe large enough, many
Oj ’s would give Lij ≈ 1. Then Pij ≡ P (Ti|Oj) would be highest for theories
with the highest pi ≡ p(Ti), e.g., for the simple theory that all Oj ’s certainly
exist, with essentially no influence from observations.
But if some observations occur more in some theory, surely they should
be assigned higher conditional probabilities in that theory. E.g., suppose T1
predicts 1 observation of O1 and 10
6 observations of O2, whereas T1 predicts
106 observations of O1 and 1 observation of O2. Then surely L11 < L21. To
accomplish this [2], one might restrict to theories Ti giving∑
j
Lij ≡
∑
j
P (Oj |Ti) = 1, (2)
so the total probability of all observations is 1 for each theory T1.
One might expand this rule to a set of principles [2] for Bayesian meta-
theories:
1. Prior Alternatives Principle: The set of alternatives to be assigned con-
ditional probabilities by theories should be chosen logically prior to the
observation to be used to test the theories.
2. Normalization Principle: The sum of the conditional probabilities each
theory assigns to all of the alternatives in the chosen set should be unity.
3. Conscious Anthropic Principle: The alternatives ideally should be cho-
sen to be conscious perceptions or observer-moments.
2 Sensible Quantum Mechanics
Conventional quantum mechanics does not seem to obey these principles [1],
but Sensible Quantum Mechanics or Mindless Sensationalism [3, 4, 5] does. In
it, there is a quantum world (what one might call the physical world, excluding
consciousness) with quantum amplitudes and expectation values, but no prob-
abilities, and there is a conscious world (what one might call the mental world)
3
with frequency-type measures or statistical probabilities. Interpreting the un-
conscious quantum world itself probabilistically is taken to be probabilism, an
aesthemamorphic myth.
The axioms of Sensible Quantum Mechanics are the following:
1. Quantum World Axiom: The unconscious “quantum world” Q is com-
pletely described by an appropriate algebra of operators and by a suit-
able state σ (a positive linear functional of the operators) giving the
expectation value 〈A〉 ≡ σ[A] of each operator A.
2. Conscious World Axiom: The “conscious world” M , the set of all con-
scious perceptions, has a fundamental measure µ(S) for each subset S
of M .
3. Quantum-Consciousness Connection: The measure µ(S) for each set S
of conscious perceptions is given by the expectation value of a corre-
sponding “awareness operator” B(S), a positive-operator-valued (POV)
measure, in the state σ of the quantum world:
µ(S) = 〈B(S)〉 ≡ σ[B(S)]. (3)
If for simplicity we suppose that there is a discrete set of quantum opera-
tors and a discrete set of conscious perceptions or observations Oj , then each
Sensible Quantum Mechanics (SQM) theory Ti has
1. Set of operators A
(i)
j and algebra A
(i)
j A
(i)
k =
∑
l c
(i) l
jk A
(i)
l
2. Quantum state σ1 giving 〈A(i)j 〉 = σi[A(i)j ].
3. Normalized positive operators B
(i)
j for observations Oj ,
∑
j σi[B
(i)
j ] = 1.
4. Lij ≡ P (Oj |Ti) = σi[B(i)j ] = normalized measure of Oj in Ti.
Then if one assigns epistemic prior probabilities pi for Ti and has the
observation Oj , the epistemic posterior probability for Ti is, by Bayes’ theorem,
Pij ≡ P (Ti|Oj) =
piσi[B
(i)
j ]∑
k pkσk[B
(k)
j ]
. (4)
The principles of Bayesian meta-theories proposed here and exemplified by
Sensible Quantum Mechanics may be related to various other principles that
have been advocated:
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1. Copernican Principle: We are not specially privileged.
2. Weak Anthropic Principle: What we observe is conditioned upon our
existence as observers.
3. Principle of Mediocrity: We are a “typical” civilization [6].
4. Strong Self-Sampling Assumption (SSSA): “One should reason as if one’s
present observer-moment were a random sample from the set of all
observer-moments in its reference class” [7].
5. Conditional Aesthemic Principle (CAP): “Unless one has compelling
contrary evidence, one should reason as if one’s conscious perception
were a random sample from the set of all conscious perceptions” [2, 3,
4, 5].
3 Application to Single-History versus Many-Worlds
Quantum Theory
One can apply these Bayesian meta-theory principles in general, and the frame-
work of Sensible Quantum Mechanics in particular, to various issues. For ex-
ample, in principle (if the quantum state of the universe is suitable) one can
make statistical tests to distinguish between single-universe and many-worlds
versions of quantum theory [8, 9, 10].
Consider a set of quantum theories giving 99.9% probability for a small
universe with N1 = 1 civilization seeing O1, say with negative cosmological
constant Λ < 0, and 0.1% probability for a large universe, N2 = 10
6 civiliza-
tions seeing O2, say with positive cosmological constant Λ > 0. Let T1 be a
single-history theory with just a small universe, T2 be a single-history theory
with just a large universe, and T3 a many-worlds theory with both a small and
a large universe. Say the respective prior probabilities for these three theories
are p1, p2, and p3, with p1 + p2 = 0.9 and p3 = 0.1, so that initially one gives
only 10% probability for many-worlds. Since the small universe is supposed
to have 999 times the probability of a large universe, for the single-universe
theories say p1 = 0.999(p1 + p2) = 0.8991 and p2 = 0.001(p1 + p2) = 0.009.
In T1, O1 is certain and O2 is impossible, so
L11 ≡ P (O1|T1) = 1, L12 ≡ P (O2|T1) = 0. (5)
Conversely, in T2, O1 is impossible and O2 is certain, so
L21 ≡ P (O1|T2) = 0, L22 ≡ P (O2|T2) = 1. (6)
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On the other hand, in T3, observations are made of both a small universe
and a large universe, so if we take the probabilities of the observations to be
weighted by the number of civilizations making them, we get
L31 ≡ P (O1|T3) = N1(0.999)
N1(0.999) +N2(0.001)
=
0.999
1000.999
≈ 0.001, (7)
L32 ≡ P (O2|T3) = N1(0.001)
N1(0.999) +N2(0.001)
=
1000
1000.999
≈ 0.999.
Suppose then we see O2 (large universe, Λ > 0). Then applying Bayes’
theorem gives the posterior probabilities of the three theories as
P (T1|O2) = p1L12
p1L12 + p2L22 + p3L32
= 0, (8)
P (T2|O2) = p2L22
p1L12 + p2L22 + p3L32
≈ 0.009,
P (T3|O2) = p3L32
p1L12 + p2L22 + p3L32
≈ 0.991.
Thus, in this hypothetical case, even though initially one gave the many-
worlds theory only a 10% prior probability of being true, after the observation
one would then give it more than 99% posterior probability of being true.
Therefore, in principle one can gain observational evidence of whether or not
the many-worlds version of quantum theory is correct; it is not just an equiv-
alent interpretation of a single quantum theory.
4 Application to Fake Universes
Another application is to fake universes. Theories with posthuman civiliza-
tions seem in danger of producing too many fake universes [11]. Taking
substrate-independence of consciousness as given, Nick Bostrom argues, “. . . at
least one of the following propositions is true:
1. the humans species is very likely to go extinct before reaching a ‘posthu-
man’ stage;
2. any posthuman civilization is extremely unlikely to run a significant
number of simulations of their evolutionary history (or variations thereof);
3. we are almost certainly living in a computer simulation.”
Paul Davies [12] draws the following conclusion from this argument: “For
every original world, there will be a stupendous number of available virtual
worlds—some of which would even include machines simulating virtual worlds
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of their own, and so on ad infinitum.” John Barrow [13] makes the further
point, “So we suggest that, if we live in a simulated reality, we should expect
occasional sudden glitches, small drifts in the supposed constants and laws
of nature over time, and a dawning realization that the flaws of nature are
as important as the laws of nature for our understanding of true reality.” If
much of posthuman computer simulation is done by the analogue of today’s
teenagers, I myself would expect even more chaos in simulations.
Since we have not observed these postulated sudden glitches, drifts, and
chaos, we might seek explanations of why they are not seen, incantations to
ward off fake universes. Bostrom himself [11] noted that humans may go
extinct before becoming posthuman, or that posthumans may be unlikely to
run simulations. But Davies [12] is arguing that these explanations would not
ward off fake universes if there is a multiverse, which he takes as a reductio ad
absurdum suggesting no multiverse.
In my mind, the weakest assumption leading to fake universes is the as-
sumption [11] of the substrate-independence of consciousness. If that is not
correct, then it could well be that most simulated beings simply are not con-
scious (and so, as conscious beings, we are not likely to be simulated). One
might analyze this question within the framework of Sensible Quantum Me-
chanics, which postulates that there is a precise positive operator Bj for each
observation or conscious perception Oj . Substrate-independence seems vague
to me but might be taken to mean that Bj is invariant under some set of trans-
formations (perhaps unitary), such as the assumption that Bj = Bˆj = UBjU˜
for some set of (U, U˜ ) pairs. But why should this be true? It seems highly
implausible to me.
I am reminded of the South Pacific cargo cults, which arose out of ob-
servations during World War II that after airfields and conning towers were
built on their islands, aircraft landed with cargo. Thinking that the airfields
and conning towers were the sufficient conditions for such cargo to arrive, they
themselves built other airfields and conning towers, but the expected cargo did
not arrive. It seems to me that we are at a similar primitive stage concern-
ing what conditions are sufficient for consciousness (e.g., what the operators
Bj are in Sensible Quantum Mechanics), so guesses that they are substrate
independent are very likely to be quite wrong.
5 Application to Boltzmann Brains
Another application is to Boltzmann brains. Theories in which spacetime
can last too long seem in danger of producing too many Boltzmann brains
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(BBs) with mostly disordered observations, which would make our ordered
observations highly atypical [14, 15, 16].
The germ of the idea goes back to Boltzmann [17], who said that his “old
assistant” Dr. Schuetz had suggested that our observed universe might be a
giant thermal fluctuation. Although this would be extremely improbable for
any particular large region of the universe, it would certainly occur somewhere
if the universe were large enough.
However, more recently it has been noticed [18, 19] that it would be much
less improbable for a particular region of the universe to have just a small
fluctuation give our observations, rather than the entire observable region of
the universe. For example, one might postulate that a human brain arose from
a thermal fluctuation in a state in which it had the same conscious awareness
as if it had been making observations of a large region of the universe, even if
the large region were actually not at all what the conscious awareness thought
it was. (E.g., the conscious perception of the brain might be that observations
had been made of distant stars and galaxies, whereas actually the surrounding
universe might be empty, without any stars and galaxies, but just having the
brain in the same state it would have been if there had been stars and galaxies
it had observed.)
For a brain of the rough mass of a human brain of one kilogram to arise
from a thermal fluctuation in empty deSitter space at its Gibbons-Hawking
[20] temperature TdS, the expected number per 4-volume (3-volume of space
multiplied by the time interval in spacetime) for such long-lasting brains or
‘long brains’ (lbs) would be
Nlb ∼ e−(1 kg)c2/TdS ∼ e−1069 . (9)
This is very tiny but would apparently be important if the universe lasted long
enough to make the total 4-volume large in comparison with e10
69
times the
4-volume of the region of ordinary observers (OOs).
I realized [14, 15, 16] that the rate would be relatively much larger if the
brains were not required to come into long-lasting existence by a thermal fluc-
tuation but were just required to exist momentarily as vacuum fluctuations
(‘brief brains’ or bbs). Then if the brain were in the right state or configu-
ration, it could have a brief conscious perception and then disappear into the
vacuum again. The minimum requirement presumably would be roughly that
the matter of the brain be separated from the corresponding amount of anti-
matter that would appear during the virtual loops of the Feynman diagrams
of the vacuum fluctuation.
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For a one-kilogram human brain to become separated by its size of say 30
centimeters from the antimatter would require an action of (1 kg)c(0.3 m)/h¯ ∼
1042, so the expected number of brief brains per 4-volume would be of the
rough order of
Nbb ∼ e−(1 kg)c(0.3 m)/h¯ ∼ e−1042 . (10)
Although this again is extremely tiny, so that the expected number of
these vacuum fluctuation Boltzmann brains or brief brains (bb BBs) would be
much less than unity over the whole past history of the part of the universe we
can now observe (the ‘observable universe’), it would dominate over ordinary
observers if the universe lasted long enough to make the total 4-volume much
larger than e10
42
times the 4-volume of the region of ordinary observers, which
would apparently be the case if the universe expanded forever.
If some theory predicted that Boltzmann brains greatly dominated over
ordinary observers, we would expect that in that theory we would most likely
be BBs rather than OOs. Only a very tiny fraction of BBs would give con-
sciousness (though say still much larger than the number of OOs), but since
we must be conscious to observe anything, this condition is a necessary selec-
tion effect, so that if such conscious BBs and/or OOs exist, it would not be
at all improbable that we are a conscious BB or OO (and most likely a BB if
there are far more conscious experiences produced by them, say in a universe
that lasts much longer and grows much bigger than the region where OOs can
exist).
However, once we include the necessary selection effect that we are con-
scious, the conditional probabilities for the various possible natures of the
conscious perceptions should be given by the theory. If BBs enormously dom-
inate over OOs, we should expect that we are BBs rather than OOs (or rather
you should, since then most probably I am just a figment of your imagina-
tion). But only a very tiny fraction of BB conscious perceptions would be
expected to be so ordered as yours generally are, with coherent visual im-
ages and memories, so the fact that yours are highly ordered counts as strong
statistical evidence against any theory that implies that almost all conscious
perceptions are produced by BBs (since they would produce mostly disordered
observations).
If one includes more details of the order that you observe, then the like-
lihood that your observation comes from a theory in which BBs dominate is
even lower. For example, even among the tiny fraction of BB conscious per-
ceptions that are ordered, only a tiny fraction would give ordered observations
of, say, galaxy-galaxy correlations. And of these, only a tiny fraction would
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give a galaxy-galaxy correlation similar to what you observe or may be aware
of from what you think are the observations of others. So if you put in all the
detail of the order that you observe or are aware of, it would be very unlikely
that it is a conscious perception produced in a theory in which Boltzmann
brains greatly dominate.
Although the next step would be going beyond what could be observation-
ally checked, one might note that even among the extremely tiny fraction of
BB conscious perceptions that included all the details of the order that you
perceive, only a very tiny fraction of these would be non-illusory, say of actual
galaxies, since there would be far more BBs in the entire huge spacetime to
have brains in just the right states to have illusory perceptions that they have
observed galaxies with all the correlations that you observe or are aware of,
than for all the ‘observed’ galaxies actually to exist.
In conclusion, theories in which Boltzmann brains greatly dominate over
ordinary observers would make your or my observations highly atypical. Some
might argue [1] that this atypicality does not imply a correspondingly small
likelihood for these theories, but I would respond [2] that it should.
Let me give some numerical estimates for the conditions that Boltzmann
brains might dominate ordinary observers in our universe. Basically, a suf-
ficient condition would seem to be that the expectation value of the total
4-volume of our comoving region of the universe is infinite when one includes
the future.
After the period of radiation domination ended when the linear size of a
comoving region of our universe was thousands of times smaller than today,
our observed comoving region (that given by fixed markers such as galax-
ies that move apart with the expansion of the universe) is apparently domi-
nated by a cosmological constant Λ and by low-velocity massive particles with
negligible pressure (called ‘dust’ in cosmology), a cold-dark-matter-Λ model
or CDMΛ model. Its spacetime geometry is apparently well described by
the k = 0 (spatially flat) Friedmann-Robertson-Walker metric with unit-jerk
(J ≡ a2(d3a/dt3)/(da/dt)3 = 1, where a(t) is the linear size of a fixed comov-
ing region as a function of the time t),
ds2 = T 2[−dτ2 + (sinh4/3 τ)(dr4 + r2dθ2 + r2 sin2 θdϕ2)]. (11)
The Hubble Space Telescope key project [21] gives that the present Hub-
ble constant of our universe, today’s value of H ≡ d ln a/dt, is H0 = 72 ± 8
km/s/Mpc. From the third-year results of theWilkinson Microwave Anisotropy
Probe (WMAP), the fraction of the critical energy density given by the cosmo-
logical constant is ΩΛ = 0.72 ± 0.04. Putting these numbers together [14, 16]
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gives that the asymptotic value of the Hubble expansion rate in the distant
future is
HΛ =
√
Λ/3 = H0
√
ΩΛ ≈ (16 ± 2 Gyr)−1, (12)
the value of the constant parameter T in the metric above is
T = (2/3)H−1Λ = 11± 1.5 Gyr, (13)
the present value of the dimensionless time coordinate τ in the metric above
is
τ0 = tanh
−1
√
ΩΛ ≈ 1.25 ± 0.09, (14)
and the present value of the Hubble constant, H0, multiplied by the present
value of the age, t0, or the present value of d ln a/d ln t, is
H0t0 =
2
3
tanh−1
√
ΩΛ√
ΩΛ
≈ 0.99 ± 0.04. (15)
It is interesting that this last value is consistent with unity, up to a fraction
of the current observational uncertainties. This means that when one plots the
linear size a versus the time t since the beginning in this model (applicable long
after very early inflation, and also after radiation domination ended), the a(t)
curve bends downward during the first part of the history (deceleration, when
dark matter dominated and made gravity attractive) and then bends upward
during the latter part of the past history (acceleration, when the cosmological
constant or dark energy dominated and made gravity repulsive on cosmological
scales) in just such a way that if one draws a straight line tangent to the
a(t) curve at the present time t0, it will have slope da/dt that is very nearly
the same as a/t and hence will very nearly go through the origin. To put
it another way, not counting the very early inflationary period, the value of
linear size over age, a/t, is, within the current observational uncertainties,
minimized at the present time. This coincidence, along with the observed
spatial flatness, plus the fact that the current best estimate [22] of the age
13.7 Gyr (Gigayears or billions of years) has the same first three digits as the
reciprocal of the fine structure constant, 1/α ≈ 137.036, allows one to write
the metric and parameters above in an easy-to-remember form that I might
call the mnemonic universe: CDMΛ k = 0 FRW t0 = H
−1
0 = 10
8 yr/α.
If this expanding universe lasts forever, then for any fixed comoving volume
(e.g., the physically expanding volume occupied by some fixed set of galaxies
and whatever massive particles they may eventually decay into, say electrons
and positrons) that presumably contains only a finite number of ordinary ob-
servers (say if they cannot exist after the stars burn out in a finite time), one
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will have an infinite amount of 4-volume in the infinite future, and hence ap-
parently an infinite number of Boltzmann brains, infinitely dominating over
the presumably finite number of ordinary observers. One might however pos-
tulate that the universe will not expand forever but perhaps decay to some
entirely different configuration obeying quite different effective laws of physics
(say not giving any conscious brains at all) by the quantum formation of a
bubble that then expands at the speed of light and destroys all that it engulfs.
If the bubble nucleation rate per 4-volume is A (for ‘annihilation,’ which is
what the bubble would do to the present form and laws of physics of the uni-
verse), then the expectation value of the total 4-volume per fixed comoving
3-volume would be finite only if the bubble formation rate is greater than some
calculable minimum [14, 16]:
A > Amin =
9
4pi
H4Λ =
Λ4
4pi
≈ (18 ± 2 Gyr)−4 ∼ e−563, (16)
where the last number is in Planck units, setting h¯ = c = G = 1.
For a given value of A, the survival probability of the CDMΛ k = 0 FRW
model above is
P (t) = exp

−16
27
A
Amin
∫ 3
2
HΛt
0
dx sinh2 x
(∫ 3
2
HΛt
x
dy
sinh2/3 y
)3. (17)
Given that we have lasted until today, the probability per year for being
annihilated by a bubble that has formed just outside our past light cone (and
hence which will engulf us within the coming year, though we cannot see any
signal of its coming since it would be coming at essentially the speed of light)
would be greater than one part in one hundred billion. With the present earth
population of nearly 7 billion, this would give an minimal expected death
rate of about 7 persons per century. (Of course, it could not be 7 persons in
one century, but all 7 billion with a probability of about one in a billion per
century.) It also gives an upper limit on the present half-life of our universe
of 19 Gyr [14].
Since we do not see that our observations are so disordered as would be
statistically predicted if Boltzmann brains greatly dominated over ordinary
observers, we might seek an explanation of why they apparently do not dom-
inate, incantations to ward off Boltzmann brains:
1. The universe may be decaying classically if the quintessence potential
slowly slides negative, so that the universe rolls into oblivion [23].
2. The universe may be decaying quantum mechanically with e−563
<∼ A <∼
e−556, though this seems to require unnatural fine tuning [14, 15, 16].
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3. Observers might conceivably fill the entire universe and be too large to
form by vacuum fluctuations [14, 15, 16].
4. The local view restricts the 3-volume to the causal patch [24].
5. Use a regularization effectively cutting off before the Boltzmann brains
[25]
6. Boltzmann brains should be lumped with bubble formation [26].
7. Holographic cosmology gives a time-dependent Hamiltonian [27].
8. ‘Constants’ of physics change so that the rate per 4-volume of Boltzmann
brains asymptotically decays to zero [28].
9. Restrict to only certain group-averaged quantum states [29].
10. Quantum field theory may not apply to brains [14, 16].
11. We may not be typical [1].
Since an astronomical decay rate is suggested by one way of regularizing
Boltzmann brains, and since it is not completely ruled out, perhaps we should
take it seriously as one possibility (though not the only one). So let us see
what are implications of the possible astronomical decay rate.
If ordinary observers could last until engulfed by a bubble:
1. They could not see it coming and so would not dread it.
2. They would be destroyed so fast they would feel no pain.
3. There would be no grieving survivors left behind.
So it would be the most humanely possible execution.
Furthermore, the universe will always persist in some decreasing fraction
or measure of Everett worlds. Thus one could never absolutely rule out a de-
caying universe by observations at any finite time, though at sufficiently late
times observations would be strong statistical evidence against the astronom-
ical decay rate.
The main point of my discussing this scenario is not to advocate a partic-
ular solution to the Boltzmann brain problem, but rather to stimulate more
research on the huge scientific mystery of the measure for the string/M land-
scape [30, 31] or other multiverse theory [32].
13
6 Application to Biological Evolution
Sensible Quantum Mechanics suggests we are effectively selected randomly by
our measure of consciousness, like winners in a cosmic jackpot [33]. No further
selection would be needed within a particular SQM theory.
This does not explain which SQM theory is correct. One might suppose
it was chosen by a highly lawful and yet benevolent God (perhaps ultimately
simple [34], say the greatest possible being, contra Dawkins’ idea that God
is complex [35]), who wanted to create understanding conscious beings in His
image within a highly ordered and elegant multiverse.
Within Darwinian evolution on earth, our ancestors would not just be
random life but conditionalized by being our ancestors. One or more correlated
steps might be highly improbable on a per-planet basis [36] (say P ∼ 10−n
with n ≫ 24 so that the probability would be very low for any others within
the observable universe of probably not more than 1024 planets). Only steps
off our ancestral line can be argued to be probable to occur on a random planet
in which the steps up to that point have occurred. It would be interesting to
see what features of complexity and intelligence developed off our ancestral
line (e.g., to octopi from our last common ancestor), and what features have
developed only within our ancestral line. Some of the latter features could
be so rare that they have not occurred anywhere else within the observable
universe (the part we can see), even though the entire universe may be so vast
that all of these features have occurred many times very much further away
than we can possibly see.
7 Conclusions
1. Scientific theories need to be testable by observations.
2. Multiverse theories can in principle be testable if they give probabilities
for observations that depend upon the theory.
3. Sensible Quantum Mechanics (SQM) gives probabilities that are expec-
tation values of positive operators associated with observations or con-
scious perceptions, and in principle they can be tested observationally.
4. One can test between single-history and many-worlds theories.
5. Fake universe and Boltzmann brains are threats to certain multiverse
(and single-universe) theories.
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6. Sensible Quantum Mechanics suggests that fake universes may not be
a threat, since there is no compelling reason to believe in the substrate
independence of consciousness.
7. There are many suggested solutions for Boltzmann brains, but it just is
not clear what the correct one is.
8. No further life principle is needed within a Sensible Quantum Mechanics
theory, but which Sensible Quantum Mechanics theory is correct needs
explaining.
9. From the view of foresight, our biological ancestors may be highly im-
probable, post-selected by our existence as beings with a high measure
of conscious perceptions.
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